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SOMETIMES MERELY AS A MEANS: WHY KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY REQUIRES THE 
LEGALIZATION OF KIDNEY SALES 
D. Robert MacDougall 
Running Head: Kant Requires the Legalization of Kidney Sales 
Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in 
some form of Kant’s moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders 
this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant’s approach to law in 
his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant’s political philosophy 
requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales 
must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant’s approach to 
laws, such as those governing kidney distribution, was formed in part by 
considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics 
literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The 
author explains some of Kant’s reasons for rejecting this assumption, and 
concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on 
the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable. 
Keywords: organ markets, Kant’s political philosophy, health policy, kidney 
transplant, contract law 
The moral and legal permissibility of selling kidneys has been heavily disputed in the contemporary 
bioethics literature. Most jurisdictions prohibit such sales, including the European Union and the United 
States. Currently, the only existing exception to this rule is Iran, which legalized compensation for kidney 
donation in 1988 (Ghods and Savaj 2006). Whether such sales should be legally permitted raises a host of 
complex issues, and the question has provoked several book-length works and dozens of articles.  
 Among the more frequently cited arguments regarding the permissibility of a market in organs are 
arguments originating in Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant’s moral philosophy seems particularly relevant to 
the permissibility of such markets, in part because Kant categorically denied the moral permissibility of 
selling any part of the human body. 
 To show that such sales are immoral, however, is not yet to show that they should be illegal. Most 
people will readily concede that, in principle, not all immoral actions should also be illegal. But in this 
paper I will argue, not only that Kant’s moral arguments are not demonstrative in showing that such sales 
should be illegal; but that Kantian philosophy cannot support legal prohibitions of organ sales at all, and 
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further, that Kant’s political philosophy requires the legal permissibility of kidney sales,  even if such 1
sales are deeply immoral. 
 The paper will proceed in three major parts. First, I will briefly explain the main features of 
Kant’s moral philosophy that led him, and many contemporary writers after him, to argue that selling 
organs is immoral. Contemporary writers have generally thought that this argument by itself could, if 
successful, either fully or partially justify legal prohibitions against selling kidneys. Second, I will argue 
that Kant’s political philosophy not only does not justify these legal prohibitions but requires laws 
prohibiting sales to be understood as violating what Kant calls “innate right.” A careful consideration of 
Kant’s major principles and several key texts, however, suggests that while kidney sales must be 
permitted, contracts for these sales cannot be enforced. In the third section I consider whether it is tenable 
to continue treating the question of the legality of organ markets on the basis of Kant’s moral rather than 
political philosophy. I argue that Kant effectively shows why his moral philosophy cannot be used to 
justify laws or policies in the ways that his contemporary interpreters have imagined, and consequently, 
that normative justifications of legal prohibitions grounded in Kantian moral philosophy should be 
considered untenable. 
I. KANTIAN MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITING KIDNEY SALES 
There is little doubt that Kant himself thought that it is morally impermissible to sell human body parts. 
Kant claims that one may not maim, dismember, or otherwise permanently alter one’s own body for any 
purpose other than to save one’s own life. A person is not permitted to sell a limb or even a finger (Kant 
 In this essay, I use “legal permissibility” and “legalization” to indicate the specific legal features I explicitly defend 1
in this essay, and not others that people sometimes associate with these terms. The argument here is most obviously 
directed against criminalization of kidney sales, but it is not merely an argument for decriminalization, because I 
also give arguments relevant to whether kidney sales should be officially discouraged or disincentivized by the state, 
and because I also discuss the implications of Kant’s political philosophy for understanding when consent for organ 
sales has been obtained, and whether contracts for kidney sales are legally enforceable. It is particularly important to 
note that, unlike several recent authors, by arguing for the “legalization” of a market I do not suppose that the state 
should take positive steps towards establishing such a market on the grounds that it would save lives or have other 
beneficial consequences.
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1980, 124). A man cannot have himself castrated to make it possible to earn a living as a singer. Selling or 
even giving away a tooth is a way of “partially murdering oneself” (Kant 1996b, 6:423).  2
 Commentators have picked up on two major strains of argument for these views. First, in his pre-
critical lectures, Kant offers an argument against organ sales, explaining that a person cannot be both 
property and a person (Kant 1980, 165). To claim that someone is both is “self-contradictory.” Because a 
person cannot be his own property, he is not “at his own disposal.” Consequently, he cannot sell any part 
of his body.  
 We might call this argument a metaphysical one, because it seems to depend on the idea that it is 
a metaphysical mistake to think of a person as property. Various commentators have followed Kant here 
(Harré 1987, Cohen 1999). The difficulty with the metaphysical argument, taken alone, is that while it 
may indeed be a metaphysical mistake or even a contradiction to claim that a person is both a person and 
property, it is not clear why it is morally wrong to act on that basis. Kant needs a further argument to 
show that treating a person as property or a thing is not just a metaphysical mistake, but also a moral one.  
 Kant of course later worked out just such a principle, the categorical imperative (especially as 
summarized in the formula of humanity and the idea of human dignity). The second argument Kant 
provides against organ sales is more easily tied to his moral arguments, and occurs in the Doctrine of 
Virtue. In that work, Kant says that to “maim” oneself or “deprive oneself of an integral organ” (such as a 
“tooth”) is to commit “partial suicide” (Kant 1996b, 6:423). Organ selling is wrong, evidently, for the 
same reasons that suicide is wrong. Since Kant argues (both in this passage and elsewhere) that suicide 
violates the categorical imperative, it seems natural to assume that Kant thinks organ sales violate  the 
categorical imperative in the same way that suicide does. Because this second argument relies explicitly 
on Kant’s moral principles as described in the various formulations of the categorical imperative, we can 
refer to this second argument as the moral argument against organ selling.  
 Commentators have generally sought to explain the moral argument either in terms of the formula 
of humanity (the second formulation of the categorical imperative) or the idea of human dignity (which 
Kant describes in his discussion of the third formulation of the categorical imperative). They have reached 
 All references to Kant’s works use the Prussian Academy pagination, except for those from Kant’s Lectures on 2
Ethics (1980).
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various conclusions about whether and to what extent this moral argument succeeds. Some have argued 
that Kant’s argument, or something closely related to it, successfully shows why kidney sales, but not 
donations, are impermissible (Chadwick 1989, Kass 1993, Cohen 1999, Stempsey 2000, Cohen 2002, 
Kass 2002, 185, Morelli 2004, Heubel and Biller-Andorno 2005). Others have argued that any arguments 
Kant makes against sales also apply to donations, because the arguments are against cutting out and using 
one’s organs per se, not just selling them. Some take this to be a reason to forbid both sales and donations, 
or at least some sales and donations (Powers 1999); while others take this to be a compelling reason for 
rejecting or re-examining Kantian arguments applied to organ markets (Gerrand 1999, Gill and Sade 
2002, Cherry 2005, 135, Taylor 2005, 151, Cherry 2009). Some conclude that organ sales might be 
permissible, on a Kantian view, under some circumstances but not others (Munzer 1993, Munzer 1994, 
Green 2001, Kerstein 2009b, Kerstein 2009a, Alpinar-Şencan 2015). And others conclude that Kant fails 
altogether to ground the impermissibility of organ sales in the categorical imperative (Engelhardt 1996, 
351, Bole III 1999).(Taylor 2005, 151) 
 It is important to note that nearly all authors either say, or seem to assume, that their analyses of 
Kant’s moral or metaphysical arguments have direct applicability to the laws that should govern organ 
distribution. While one author explicitly notes that he does not intend his conclusions to ground legal 
prohibitions (Munzer 1994), others extend their conclusions about the morality of organ sales directly to 
the legal question about how the distribution of kidneys ought to operate (Chadwick 1989, Cohen 2002, 
Morelli 2004, Kerstein 2009b), or suggest that a Kantian moral analysis could or should, in principle, 
directly shape laws and policies (Green 2001, Shell 2009). Other authors motivate their arguments by 
pointing to the importance of the moral duties discussed by Kant for shaping laws and policies (Kass 
1993, Kass 2002, Kerstein 2009a). Even critics of legal prohibitions have enlisted Kant’s moral 
arguments as support for laws permitting some kinds of organ exchanges or sales (Wilkinson 2004, Taylor 
2007). Kant’s moral principles correctly understood, they argue, undermine rather than support legal 
prohibitions. And finally, even those who have argued that Kant’s arguments fail generally seem to 
assume that if Kant’s moral arguments had succeeded, then those arguments would have implications for 
laws and policies (Bole III 1999, Engelhardt Jr. 1999, Taylor 2005).  
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 This general assumption, that metaphysics or moral philosophy should or could directly shape the 
laws governing the distribution of kidneys, is perhaps most remarkable because it is an assumption that 
Kant seems not to have shared.  Kant himself distinguished sharply between political philosophy and 3
moral philosophy, and did not think that either metaphysical or moral arguments should directly 
determine the content of laws and policies.  4
II. KANTIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND KIDNEY SALES 
A. Principles of Right 
Kant assumes, in both his moral and political philosophy, that persons possess “free choice.” Free choice 
is the capacity possessed by human beings for acting in ways that are not determined by sensibility, and in 
this way it is the opposite of “animal choice” (Kant 1996a, 6:213). Persons are distinguished from 
animals, in Kantian metaphysics, by the fact that their choices are not necessarily determined by laws of 
nature. Their choices can also be determined by laws of “pure reason.”  
 However, Kant did not think that laws and policies can force persons to determine their choices in 
accordance with the laws of pure reason, or the moral law. (In fact, attempting to do so would be 
conceptually incoherent and would amount, in Kant’s words, to a “contradiction”—I shall have more to 
say about this towards the end of this essay). Instead, laws and policies create the conditions necessary for 
the possibility of exercising free choice, in the sense that they help determine what belongs to each, which 
is a necessary precursor to talking about whether someone acts in accordance with the moral law. 
 While the law is not directly concerned with enforcing or ensuring “free choice” itself, it is 
concerned with what Kant calls “freedom in the external use of choice” (1996a, 6:214) (or what he refers 
 This is not to say that metaphysics and moral philosophy do not shape Kant’s political philosophy—his political 3
philosophy is, after all, found in the Metaphysics of Morals. Rather, Kant’s political philosophy is a sophisticated 
account of the metaphysics of political authority that does not share the assumption of recent commentators, that 
state power should be used to directly enforce moral duties or metaphysical truths. For an account of the importance 
that a “minimal metaphysics” plays in Kant’s political philosophy, see Flikschuh (2000).
 I will explain some features of this division in this article. The relationship between the two is, however, a 4
complicated topic that has generated a large literature. See especially Guyer (1998, 2002), Wood (1997), Pogge 
(1998), Ripstein (2009, Appendix), Willaschek (Willaschek 2009), and Seel (2009).
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to later as simply the “free use” of choice). This external freedom is concerned with, roughly, the actions 
that we commit (as opposed to the ends we adopt, for example). However, laws and policies are not 
concerned with all the actions we commit: instead, they are concerned with our actions only insofar as 
these affect other persons. So, Kant says that the concept of right is concerned, “first, only with the 
external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have 
direct (or indirect) influence on each other” (1996a, 6:230). The concept of right, then, on which all laws 
and policies should be based, is entirely “relational,” where “relational” refers to relationships with other 
people—not our relationships to ourselves, or to the moral law. 
 Kant’s general strategy in his political philosophy—expressed most fully in his Doctrine of Right
—will seem familiar to readers of the Groundwork. The work as a whole is built on several carefully 
delineated (and closely related) fundamental principles. Kant calls the most fundamental of these the 
universal principle of right: “so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (Kant 1996a, 6:231).  
 This universal principle of right describes the way in which my actions may or may not 
permissibly affect others. It prescribes, as the most basic political norm, the duty not to interfere with the 
freedom of others, when their freedom is specified according to a universal law. If the free use of my 
choice conflicts with someone else’s freedom, then that use of free choice is impermissible or non-
rightful. 
 Conversely, if my use of free choice can coexist with everyone else’s freedom, then my use of 
free choice is right. This can be seen a little more clearly when viewed in light of what Kant calls “innate 
right.” According to Kant,  
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can 
coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only 
original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. (Kant 1996a, 6:237)  
Innate right, then, is simply the right that corresponds to the duty contained in the universal principle of 
right: if everyone has a duty to act in ways that can coexist with my freedom, then I have a right to be free 
of others acting in ways that cannot coexist with my freedom (provided, in each case, that our freedom is 
considered in the same way, under a universal law). I have a right to use my freedom however I wish as 
long as it does not interfere with their freedom. And they have no right to curb or otherwise interfere with 
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my freedom, unless my freedom interferes with theirs, as described under a universal law. Kant spells out 
this implication explicitly: innate right means that I am “authorized” to do whatever I want to others, as 
long as it does not violate their rights or “diminish what is theirs” (Kant 1996a, 6:238). 
 Because each is entitled to exactly the same kind of freedom, i.e. freedom that is compatible with 
the freedom of others in accordance with a universal law, persons are fundamentally equal under law. 
Each person has total authority to direct him or herself however he or she wishes, provided it does not 
conflict with the rights of others. One contemporary commentator has described this variously as the 
quality of being “independent” (Ripstein 2009, 14 ff) or “one’s own master” (Ripstein 2009, Ch. 2): we 
are equal in the sense that we each have a right to order our own affairs and to use what is ours, provided 
our use does not conflict with the freedom of others.   5
 Because right is concerned primarily with securing this kind of independence for each, Kant says 
that right is concerned with the formal conditions of outer freedom, rather than the matter of freedom 
(Kant 1996b, 6:380). This formal/material distinction means, essentially, that right secures a formal 
domain for each person in which he or she can act without direct interference from the choices of others. 
Laws are not concerned, consequently, with the matter (or “ends”) of the choices that persons make 
within their domain of freedom. The matter of any individual’s actions—i.e., the ends towards which the 
actions are aimed—are, by definition, set by the individual him or herself, and not the state or other 
agents. 
B. Principles of Right and Kidney Sales 
1. Innate right and kidney sales 
The domain over which each person may exercise choice begins with that person’s body. Persons are free 
with respect to their own bodies primarily because for Kant, persons just are their bodies. Bodies are the 
extension of persons in space and time. Innate right specifies that each person has a right to freedom. So, 
 At least two commentators have offered somewhat different interpretations of what Kant means by “freedom” in 5
the Doctrine of Right. See Flikschuh (2000, Ch. 3) and Finnis (1987). However, the interpretation offered here is the 
traditional one. It shares crucial aspects with accounts offered in Ripstein (2009, Ch. 2) and Gregor (1963, Ch. 3), 
for example. 
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if each human body is a person, then each human body also has a right to freedom (see Ripstein 2009, 
40). 
 Freedom for an embodied person means freedom from physical interference by others, unless the 
consent of the embodied person is obtained first. So Kant uses the example of touching another’s body 
without consent as an example of what it would mean to violate a person’s “innate right.” Such touching 
directly affects what is “internally mine” (1996a, 6:248).  
 Touching without consent is not wrong, then, because it violates property rights. A person does 
not have a property right in her body. Asserting otherwise would be a metaphysical error, because persons 
and property are distinct (as discussed earlier). In this way, Kant’s account stands in sharp contrast with 
other accounts of persons’ relationships to their bodies, such as Locke’s. Rather, touching without consent 
is wrong because it violates a person’s most fundamental domain of freedom, her person itself. 
 Because a person’s domain of freedom begins with the body, persons have formal rights to do 
what they wish with their bodies, provided that their choices do not infringe on the freedoms of others. 
They may act, with respect to their own bodies, on whatever ends they wish. This right is grounded, 
again, in the fact that others have no right to interfere with an individual’s body: the body is the source 
and the primary domain of any person’s innate right to freedom.  This implies that one is authorized to 6
remove a kidney or other organ and dispose of these as one wishes, and that (correspondingly) others do 
not have a right to interfere with this. It is a person’s innate right in his or her body that grounds a right to 
sell organs.  
  Kant’s political principles, incidentally, illustrate why Kant-inspired arguments against organ 
sales in the bioethics literature have not succeeded in making a truly Kantian case against the legal 
 Kant seems to presume that rights over one’s body are relatively straightforward, because he relies on the idea that 6
a person has a right to her own body but does not give any further explanation about what this means. It seems 
unlikely Kant could hold such a simple view in an era where human bodies are often partially composed of 
transplanted tissues and medical devices. One author suggests that rights in the body ought to be understood as 
partially contingent on the determinations of the united will (Flikschuh 2010). This seems plausible, but even if Kant 
were to allow some flexibility in determining what counts as a person’s body, I don’t think it would greatly affect the 
findings of the present paper. While it may be the case that any plausible Kantian view should allow for some 
flexibility in determining what, exactly, counts as an individual’s body, in many cases what counts as an individual’s 
body/person will be relatively clear, in our day just as it was in Kant’s. In this paper, I assume that a kidney is a part 
of the person in whom it is currently implanted. So, once it is transplanted into a new person, it becomes a part of 
that person. This seems to roughly accord with the way organs are treated in the present legal context. Touching a 
kidney transplant recipient without consent gives rise to one suit of battery, not two, even if the recipient’s body 
houses a kidney from a living donor.
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permissibility of such sales. These arguments have, by and large, made reference to the formula of 
humanity, which specifies the ends on which a person must act, i.e. the matter of a person’s choice.  But 7
for Kant, laws are not concerned with the matter of a person’s choice, but rather with the formal 
conditions of outer freedom. For a Kantian argument against the legal permissibility of organ sales to 
succeed, it would have to show that such sales violate the freedom of others, where freedom is considered 
in its formal, not material sense.  
2. Prohibitions rooted in “duties of rightful honor” 
One major commentator provides an argument from Kant’s political philosophy that might be thought to 
lend support to prohibitions against kidney sales. Arthur Ripstein interprets Kant’s remarks about “duties 
of rightful honor” (elsewhere referred to by Kant as “internal duties” of right (1996a, 6:237) and “duties 
from the right of humanity in our own person” (1996a, 6:236)) to mean that there are limits on what one 
may be legally permitted to do to oneself. So, according to Ripstein, a person may not "alienate 
himself" (2009, 68) or do anything that involves destruction of a person’s “purposiveness.” Ripstein finds 
in this sufficient Kantian grounds for prohibiting euthanasia (so ‘consent is no defense against a charge of 
murder’). Although Ripstein does not address kidney sales, the argument could plausibly be extended to 
give a Kantian defense of prohibitions against kidney sales as well, since such sales could be interpreted 
as partial self-alienation and destruction of a person’s “purposiveness.”  
 It seems unlikely that Kant meant to suggest that duties of rightful honor support the 
criminalization or prohibition of consensual actions such as euthanasia or kidney sales for two main 
reasons. First is the fact that Kant categorically excludes the whole class of self-regarding duties from 
legal enforcement. This exclusion is attested to, first, by Kant’s comments about the structure of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. The Metaphysics of Morals is divided into two major sections, the Doctrine of 
Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In the preface to the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant explains the division by 
saying that duties of virtue are “duties for which there is no external lawgiving” (Kant 1996b, 6:410) 
indicating that such duties cannot be enforced, in contrast with duties of right. Because perfect duties to 
 The formula of humanity: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 7
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 1996c, 4:429). 
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oneself—such as the duty not to commit suicide or partial suicide by selling one’s organs—are described 
in the Doctrine of Virtue (only), it follows that Kant understands these as duties that cannot be enforced. 
Further attesting to the idea that Kant excludes self-regarding actions from legal prohibition is Kant’s 
comment that a person can “never do wrong in what he decides upon in regards to himself” (1996a, 
6:313). If a person cannot do wrong with respect to him- or herself, then, duties of rightful honor or 
internal duties of right cannot refer to enforceable duties that one owes to oneself (Byrd and Hruschka 
2010, 63).  Additionally, although Kant mentions duties following from the "right of humanity in our own 8
person” in several places in the Doctrine of Right, which right he associates with duties of rightful honor, 
he never suggests that these duties may be legislatively enforced, with the possible exception of bestiality 
which he mentions in an isolated comment (Kant 1996a, 6:363). 
 A second reason for thinking that Kant did not intend to criminalize violations of duties of 
rightful honor is the fact that, while it may seem difficult to accept that individuals are legally authorized 
to sell organs or otherwise violate the “right of humanity” in their own selves (given Kant’s strongly 
stated positions on this right in his various moral writings), it is even more difficult to see the grounds on 
which Kant’s political philosophy could justify the right of a third party to coercively prevent a person 
from violating this right against herself. It is true that third parties are generally authorized to coercively 
prevent someone from threatening or violating the rights of some innocent person—indeed, were this not 
possible then state authority would in principle be unjustifiable. So, one might think that it would in 
principle be permissible for a third party to stop someone from violating her own right, i.e. the right of 
humanity in her own person. However, persons always have the authority to waive their rights by 
consenting to others’ proposals, as according to the traditional principle, volenti non fit iniuria (1996a, 
6:313). In cases where consent is present, no interference or coercion is appropriate or even permissible. 
Kant further bolsters this point elsewhere by arguing that although persons are generally authorized to 
coerce those who violate their rights, they are not required to do so (Kant 1996d, 8:129). In cases where 
one violates one’s own rights, one consents and thus implicitly waives any right one would otherwise 
 I will not develop an account of what Kant means by “internal duties of right” or “rightful honor” here. For one 8
plausible explanation, see Byrd and Hruschka (2010, 63). 
11
have to coerce the wrongdoer (i.e., oneself), and there would be no authorization for third parties to 
interfere.  
C. Principles of Right and Kidney Purchases 
One might object at this point that even if persons have a right to do what they want with their kidneys, it 
has not yet been shown that there is a corresponding right to buy kidneys. Even if “sales” were technically 
licit, the state could perhaps impose restrictions on the purchase of kidneys. This is the approach of the 
Swedish government towards prostitution, for example: selling sexual services is not illegal, but buying 
them is. Such restrictions aim at eliminating a market for the item in question, even while (nominally) 
protecting persons’ rights to do what they want with their bodies.  
 The objection is plausible, particularly because Kant drew a systematic division between innate 
right, which implies a right to one’s own body, and what he calls “acquired right,” that is our rights to 
things external to ourselves, such as property, contracts, and money. Kant also thought that acquired right 
is subject to the state’s ratification. The state, acting as the embodiment of the united will, can 
conclusively settle who owns some piece of property or can determine that some property or good 
belongs to all in common. It is for this reason that possession of any piece of property is only 
“provisional” until what belongs to each is conclusively established in a civil condition (1996a, 6:264-6). 
Similarly, the state can decide when private resources become public resources through taxation (1996a, 
6:326). So, it might be thought that if the state can go so far as to garnish some part of an individual’s 
income through taxation, for example, then the state could also put limitations on how individuals use 
their income.  
 Although it is true that the state has authority to determine what is “laid down as right” (1996a, 
6:306), it does so in a way that is meant to reaffirm or make conclusive what could be determined as right 
on other grounds (namely, the principles of right discussed earlier). “Public right” is a system of laws that 
needs to be “promulgated” by the state in order to bring about a rightful condition (1996a, 6:311). Kant 
treats issues such as the police power, taxation, and welfare under this heading. These laws, however, do 
not result in any genuinely new powers for the state: rather, public right “contains no further or other 
duties of human beings among themselves than can be conceived in [private right]” (1996a, 6:306). 
12
Consequently, powers that seem new (such as the power of taxation) are conceived of as subsidiary to the 
overall purpose of the state to preserve itself (1996a, 6:326), which is in turn necessary for securing the 
requirements of private right. So, although the state has the authority to determine that a portion of my 
income must be returned to the state for the purpose of preserving the state, it does not at any point 
acquire the authority to tell me what I may do with that which remains in my possession. Indeed, the only 
reason the state has the authority to tax in the first place is so that it can protect external freedom, i.e. the 
freedom of individuals to use what is theirs according to their own plans and purposes.  
 The only exception to this rule is that the state may restrict our use of that which belongs to us by 
right in order to protect the equal freedom of others. So the state may not be able, as a general rule, to tell 
me what I can do with my wood or my matches. But it may put limits on my ability to start a fire that 
poses a hazard or a nuisance to others. In the case of organs, however, it is not clear how my purchase of a 
kidney from a consenting other affects what belongs to third parties by right.  
 The reason the state cannot prohibit purchases is similar, then, to the reason it cannot prohibit 
sales. There is simply no motivation in any of Kant’s major political principles for the restriction of either 
sales or purchases, unless those sales or purchases violate the freedom of non-consenting third parties. 
D. Kidney Exchanges and Unenforceable Contracts 
If persons have rights to buy and sell kidneys, it will seem obvious that exchanging money for kidneys 
cannot be prohibited. Be this as it may, because they involve body parts—which, as already noted, are 
metaphysically distinct from property—such exchanges create some legal complexities that are not 
encountered in more typical exchanges, such as those involving the exchange of property for money, for 
example. Most particularly, such exchanges present problems when conducted under contracts. In what 
follows, we will examine contracts in more detail. I will argue that Kant’s political philosophy, while not 
supporting the prohibition of kidney sales, also cannot support enforcing contracts for kidney sales. 
 Kant understands consensual exchanges to be rightful because they are constituted by a united 
choice (Kant 1996a, 6:271). A united choice is simply a choice made by two or more persons to 
collectively alter their respective rights. The rightfulness of a united choice is easily explained by 
reference to Kant’s principles of right, the universal principle of right and innate right. If one person 
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agrees to transfer something to someone else, she has the right to do this, provided the other chooses to 
accept it; and vice versa. Because the transaction affects only the rights of the parties to the exchange, and 
both have rights to make any choice compatible with the freedom of everyone, the exchange is rightful.  
 The usual means by which a united choice operates in an exchange is through a contract. 
Contracts are a major area of emphasis in Kant’s political philosophy (See Ripstein 2009, Ch. 5); but for 
the purposes of the present discussion, it is most important to note that contracts are a special case of a 
united choice, because they are able to create duties in the contractors to perform some specific action at 
some future date. As Kant says, contracts entitle one person to “an active obligation on the freedom and 
the means of the other” (1996a, 6:274). And, because the resulting obligation is a legal one, it can be 
enforced.  
 In the case of a contract for kidneys, a person would hypothetically create an enforceable legal 
duty to partially disembody himself, by promising to sell his kidney to someone else, and an enforceable 
legal right, in the other party, to him doing so. But the creation of any such duties or rights is impossible, 
because they violate innate right.  
 To see why this is, we must discuss innate right in more detail. An innate right—i.e., the right to 
freedom insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of others—entails a right to cut off a body part, as I 
have argued. This was explained as being a result of the fact that the domain over which a person has 
rights must necessarily begin with the body, which is the physical extension of a person in time and space. 
Describing innate right as a right to freedom that can coexist with the freedom of others implies that one 
has a right to one’s body, since such a right is presumably compatible with the freedom of everyone.   9
 Innate right has implications for the body, but the definition of innate right itself does not mention 
the body but rather the right to “freedom.” A right to freedom is somewhat different from other kinds of 
rights we might think of, such as a right to a car or a couch. The freedom I now possess is not “mine” by 
virtue of the fact that I can exclude you from having it. We speak colloquially of someone “losing their 
freedom,” of course, but the fact that I lost my freedom does not imply that someone else may have found 
or otherwise acquired it. 
 There are limitations to this compatibility, of course. See note 6 above.9
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 Instead, saying that a person has an innate right to freedom is just to say that a person has an 
innate right to a particular status: namely, a right to the status of legal person. And a legal person is just 
someone capable of having rights and duties, i.e. it is someone capable of the external use of choice. A 
person’s right to freedom is not a right to any particular thing, then (beyond, perhaps, her body, as 
suggested above). It is rather a right to exercise rights, and to be treated by others as one who can have 
rights and duties with respect to them. It includes a right to do those things that are the prerogative of all 
legal persons: a right to affect the rights and duties of others by doing the various things that have 
implications for their rights and duties, such as acquiring and alienating, or entering into consensual 
relationships with them. In this sense, it is like a Hohfeldian power: the right to freedom is the power, 
within a set of rules, to alter one’s own rights and/or the rights of others, by acquiring, alienating, 
consenting, etc.   10
 The special nature of innate right distinguishes it in two important ways from other kinds of 
rights. First, one cannot alter or relinquish one’s innate right by an act of will, or by united choice with 
other consenting persons. Unlike other rights, which can be acquired, altered, or relinquished by will, 
innate right does not depend—either for its creation or continued possession—on an act of will, but rather 
on something innate to persons, namely, their humanity (1996a, 6:237). Consequently, the only way to 
alter or relinquish an innate right is to negate the condition on which the right depends, namely, by 
altering or relinquishing one’s humanity itself. As just stated, innate right is a status or a power: 
possession of this right is what makes it possible for one’s will to effectively alter other kinds of rights 
and duties. As the power that makes it possible for one to alter rights and duties in general, innate right 
itself is not subject to modification or relinquishment in the same way as are those other rights and duties.  
 For related reasons, second, one also cannot create rights or duties in a contract that involve the 
alteration or relinquishment of innate right. Because one cannot, by consent, alter or relinquish innate 
right, the successful creation of a duty to alter or relinquish innate right would necessarily conflict with 
innate right. Rights and duties are, for Kant, non-conflicting (1996a, 6:224), and so such conflicting 
duties are conceptually impossible. But regardless of whether we agree with Kant on the conceptual 
 A power is one of four Hohfeldian incidents—the others being claim, privilege, and immunity. See Wenar (2010).10
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impossibility of conflicting rights and duties, the more fundamental point here is similar to the one above. 
Innate right is antecedent to, and independent of, any rights or duties we might create by an act of will. It 
is, in fact, the only reason why our acts of will have legal status in the first place. It is consequently 
impossible to create a right or duty that conflicts with innate right, since such a right or duty, if it 
succeeded in binding, would undermine the very condition that made it binding. It is not that such 
conflicting duties should be actively discouraged or prohibited: rather, they simply fail to displace innate 
right, and so are never successfully created. Supporting this understanding is a comment Kant makes 
about the possibility of a conflict between innate right and acquired right. Kant concludes that in this 
situation innate right takes precedence, as the right to freedom is the basis for other rights (6:238).  
 The upshot of this is that contracts that conflict with innate right fail to create an enforceable duty 
and so cannot be enforced. The failure to create the relevant legal duty means that any attempt at 
enforcement of such putative contracts would violate an individual’s innate right, and consequently that 
such enforcement would be wrong.  
 An example of a putative duty that violates innate right would be the duty contained in a contract 
for suicide. A person who contracts to commit suicide attempts to create a legally enforceable duty 
requiring him to kill himself. But killing oneself directly undermines one’s own innate right, by taking 
away the condition of innate right (one’s humanity). To be enforced, the contract relies on the agent’s 
innate right, i.e. his power to create legally enforceable duties by exercising his will. But the content of 
the contract requires the negation of this power. Enforcement of such a duty by the other party to the 
contract would require that the other be capable of obtaining a right to another’s non-existence, or to his 
or her relinquishment of innate right. But individuals do not have the authority to create such duties or 
rights.  
 If persons cannot create duties or rights conflicting with innate right, then they also cannot create 
duties or rights requiring dismemberment, such as in a contract for the removal and sale of an organ such 
as a kidney. In this case, it will seem less clear to some readers why dismemberment, particularly loss of a 
kidney, conflicts with an individual’s innate right in the same way that suicide does. “Innate right” 
belongs to persons by virtue of their “humanity” alone; but by “humanity,” Kant means “rational nature.” 
Because renal function adequate for maintaining higher brain functions usually only requires one 
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functioning kidney, it has seemed to some commentators that rational nature can survive unscathed 
following the removal of a kidney (Munzer 1994, Gill and Sade 2002)—in contrast to suicide, which 
obviously destroys all faculties, rational and otherwise. 
 However, for Kant the human body does not play a merely instrumental role in its support of 
rationality. Rather, human bodies gain their distinctive significance because they are the extension of the 
rational nature in time and space. The body, along with the self, “constitutes” the person (Kant 1997, 
27:387).  Consequently, as mentioned earlier, for Kant a person is his or her body. So it is not possible to 11
divide human bodies up into parts that are “essential” or “real” persons, because they support rational 
capacities, and those that are extraneous to persons (Powers 1999, Alpinar-Şencan 2015). Instead, the 
body as a whole is the person. It is worth pointing out that Kant’s assumption here corresponds with a 
widely-held intuition. Both common language and law treat bodies as persons. To touch my hand is to 
touch me, and not merely to touch something that is attached to me. 
 Consequently, to dismember a person is to take some physical thing that has status as a legal 
person, endowed with innate right by virtue of its humanity—in this case, a kidney—and make it into a 
mere thing, i.e. something that cannot have rights or duties. In this way, dismemberment relinquishes the 
innate right of a part of a person. Since the creation of a duty that conflicts with innate right is impossible, 
the creation of a duty to dismember myself must also be.  
 To say I cannot create a duty to dismember myself is not equivalent to saying that it is criminal 
for me to dismember myself or even to sell a part of myself to another. As already discussed, severing 
parts of one’s body may be morally wrong, but it cannot be prohibited on the grounds that it violates a 
duty to oneself: right is concerned only with making the choice of one compatible with the rights of 
others. Insofar as my action does not violate the rights of others, it is not the proper target of legal 
prohibition. Promises—even written contracts—for the sale of organs also cannot be prohibited, for the 
same reason. Although the contract must fail to create a legal duty in me to dismember myself, or to 
create a legal right in the other to my dismemberment, the contract itself does not wrong anyone. The 
 Although this quotation is from student notes from Kant’s lectures, it evinces the position Kant would later take in 11
his political philosophy and indeed all his moral writings. The quotations at the beginning of Section I show, for 
example, that Kant believed that even the little finger and testicles are partially constitutive of persons, not mere 
things attached to persons, and must be treated as such. 
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contract simply fails to endow me with a duty of self-dismemberment, or the other with a right to my 
dismemberment. 
 The impossibility of creating such duties or rights suggests that Kant’s position requires that 
contracts for the sale of organs be considered unenforceable.  Persons could still write contracts for the 12
sale of organs; such “contracts” would likely serve as evidence of consent for the transaction. But the 
contracts themselves could not be enforced because they did not actually succeed in creating new legal 
duties or rights. If either party changed their mind prior to the transaction, the other could not force 
specific performance or even compensation for breach of contract.  
E. Further Textual Evidence 
Beyond the overall argument that can be made from Kant’s principles, there are several further textual 
reasons that bolster this interpretation of Kant’s position as allowing sales but refusing to enforce 
contracts. On at least two other occasions in his political philosophy, Kant considered the implications of 
contracts that would theoretically create duties in conflict with a person’s innate right.  
 First, Kant considers the legality of a contract in which one person is sold to another (Kant 1996a, 
6:283), i.e. chattel slavery. Slavery is immoral under any plausible reading of Kant’s moral philosophy, 
yet Kant does not attack the sale on those grounds. Instead, Kant argues that a person cannot make such a 
sale, because it would mean completely renouncing his “freedom.” By completely renouncing his 
freedom, he would cease to be a person, and consequently could not be bound by the legal duty to keep 
the terms of the contract. The contract is consequently “null and void.”  
 The passage is illustrative in several ways. First, the major problem with such contracts is not that 
they are immoral. Kant does not even consider here, for example, whether someone could act as, or think 
 In current legal practice, an unenforceable contract differs from a void contract. A void contract is treated by 12
courts as if it never existed; it is of no legal effect. A variety of things may render contracts void, such as one or the 
other party contracting under duress. An exchange that occurs under a “void" contract can be considered criminal, 
because the contract does not successfully demonstrate the existence of consent. In contrast, “unenforceable” 
contracts are those that courts take as evidence of consent to some exchange, but cannot be enforced for some 
reason. In the UK, for example, contracts for prostitution are unenforceable. Prostitution is not a crime, and a 
contract for prostitution can demonstrate that consent was present (and consequently differentiates the interaction 
from both rape and theft on behalf of the john and prostitute, respectively). But such contracts cannot be enforced if 
either party wishes to back out of them. Kant seems to have taken a similar position on prostitution, as will be 
discussed later.
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of him or herself as, a slave or the property of another. Rather, the problem with such contracts is instead 
that they fail to create the relevant legal duty. Second, the reason these contracts fail to create the relevant 
legal duty is that in such contracts, the seller would have to completely renounce his freedom—i.e., would 
have to renounce the one thing to which every person has an innate right. By completely renouncing 
freedom, the seller would cease to be a legal person, and so could have neither rights nor duties.  Third, 13
since such contracts do fail to create the relevant legal duty, the conclusion is not that such contracts 
should be criminalized or prohibited, but rather that they are “null and void,” and so cannot be enforced at 
all.   14
 On another occasion, Kant considered contracts for sexual services. In Kant’s view, such 
contracts treat persons as objects, and so less than a person endowed with innate rights. Again, however, it 
is not the moral duties of the seller or buyer that are legally relevant, but rather the prospect of enforcing 
such contracts. Says Kant,  
. . . neither concubinage nor hiring a person for enjoyment on one occasion . . . 
is a contract that could hold in right. As for the latter, everyone will admit that a 
person who has concluded such a contract could not rightfully be held to the 
fulfillment of her promise if she regrets it. So with regard to the former, a 
contract to be a concubine . . . also comes to nothing; for this would be a 
contract to let and hire . . . a member for another’s use, in which, because of the 
inseparable unity of members in a person, she would be surrendering herself as a 
thing to the other’s choice. Accordingly, either party can cancel the contract with 
 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that Kant’s argument here is superficially similar to Mill’s 13
in the fifth chapter of On Liberty (1956, 125). The differences between the two are instructive, however. For Mill, 
we “allow” people to dispose of themselves, because this is the way in which their “good” is “best provided for.” 
Selling oneself into slavery, however, permanently relinquishes all future freedom, and so “defeats” the very 
“justification of allowing” persons liberty to make choices in the first place. For Mill, then, slavery contracts cannot 
be enforced because they ultimately undermine a person’s good by permanently undermining their liberty to make 
decisions concerning themselves. For Kant, the problems are entirely conceptual: a successful contract for slavery 
would make the slave a mere object, rather than a legal person, and a contract cannot obtain between two parties 
unless both are legal persons.
 Here, the term Kant uses is “void,” rather than “unenforceable.” In current legal parlance, a “void” contract is one 14
that is of no legal effect at all (see note 13). If such a contract is of no legal effect at all, it cannot even function to 
document consent. Consequently, actions that occur under it might be considered criminal since consent is not 
present.  
 It is not clear to the present author whether the distinction between “unenforceable” and “void” would have 
meant a similar thing to Kant as it does now. If so, then perhaps this serves as evidence that Kant would have 
thought, not only that contracts for slavery couldn’t be enforced, but that slavery itself should be understood as 
criminal (even though he does not say this). But this is a matter of speculation, and, in any case, the point wouldn’t 
determine whether contracts for kidneys should be understood as “void,” like contracts for slavery, or merely 
“unenforceable.” It is possible that Kant would still understand contracts for kidneys as unenforceable, as this is the 
approach he takes to at least one other exchange that violates innate right (contracts for prostitution, which I will 
discuss momentarily). Here I merely note that if Kant was familiar with something like the contemporary distinction 
between void and unenforceable, it would raise the further question, to which category should organ sales belong?
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the other as soon as it pleases without the other having grounds for complaining 
about any infringement of its rights. (Kant 1996a, 6:278–9) 
So Kant does not claim that such contracts can be forbidden. Instead, he argues that contracts requiring 
persons to sell their sexual services simply cannot be enforced: the legal consequence of the 
objectification is that “either party can cancel the contract with the other as soon as it pleases.” 
 In each of these cases—a contract for a kidney, a contract for self-enslavement, and a contract for 
prostitution or concubinage—the enforceability of the contract requires the successful creation of a legal 
duty in the seller and a legal right in the buyer that directly conflict with innate right, i.e. a person’s right 
to be considered a legal person, and consequently to hold rights and duties with respect to others. Because 
such conflicting rights and duties are impossible, the result, in contracts for kidneys as in the latter two 
examples, should be that the contracts are simply unenforceable, rather than that they should be the target 
of legal prohibitions. 
III. WHY KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY CANNOT JUSTIFY PROHIBITIONS OF SALES 
One might concede that Kant’s political philosophy does seem to require these conclusions about organ 
sales and contracts, but object on the grounds that one can hold Kant’s moral philosophy and still reject 
his political philosophy or actual political positions. 
 While there is of course some truth to this—it would be a stretch to argue that the entire Doctrine 
of Right could be derived directly from Kant’s moral philosophy—Kant himself understood important 
facets of his political philosophy to be necessitated by features inherent in his moral philosophy. Most 
important is Kant’s insistence that law and ethics must proceed according to different principles, because 
ethics is essentially a matter of one’s ends, and laws cannot determine the ends for which a person acts. 
 Kant consistently emphasizes, in his moral philosophy, that the morality of an action is not found 
in the external features of that action, but rather in the maxims adopted by the agent performing the 
action, and ultimately in the ends for which an agent acts. The first formulation of the categorical 
imperative describes morality in terms of maxims. Maxims have ends: they are often analyzed as having 
two parts, namely the action about to be performed, and the agent’s end in doing it. The second 
20
formulation of the categorical imperative further specifies the requisite ends, which include always acting 
so as to treat humanity as an end in itself. Even those actions that are otherwise unobjectionable are not 
morally praiseworthy if they fail to treat humanity as an end in itself. And the third formulation, 
depending on how one parses it out, requires acting in accordance with the laws that would characterize a 
kingdom of ends. Kant maintained this emphasis on ends as determining the morality of actions in the 
later Doctrine of Virtue, where he argues that ethics gives laws for maxims, not actions (1996b, 6:388), 
and in which he explains that the chief requirement of virtue is the duty to adopt the two ends that are also 
duties: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others (1996b, 6:385-386). 
 Kant comments decisively that public laws cannot prescribe the ends put forth in his moral 
philosophy. The only means that a state has at its disposal for achieving conformity with the law is 
coercion, and coercion cannot make a person adopt ends (Kant 1996b, 6:381). In other words, mandating 
or forbidding actions cannot actually make people act according to duty, as Kant understands it. It can, at 
best, force persons to do the right thing for the wrong reason. It is for this reason that Kant adopts a 
principle intended only to govern the external use of choice in his political philosophy, rather than a 
principle that governs free choice itself or the ends for which one acts: attempting to use coercion to force 
a person to adopt specific ends would be “self-contradictory” (Kant 1996b, 6:381).  
 Because interpreters have looked to the various formulations of Kant’s moral principles in order 
to ground the prohibition against organ sales, they fail to ground the prohibitions. The formulations of the 
categorical imperative all ultimately prescribe acting for certain ends, and since laws cannot force persons 
to adopt ends, laws also cannot make persons obedient to the categorical imperative. 
Merely passing a law prohibiting the sale of organs cannot make persons treat others as ends in 
themselves or as beings possessed of a dignity above all price. At best it incentivizes actions that are in 
conformity with, but not are not done from, duty. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The most plausible Kantian position, all things considered, is to permit the sale of organs through 
unenforceable contracts. This position is justified largely on the basis of Kant’s political, rather than 
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moral, philosophy: but as I have argued, Kant’s approach to political philosophy develops in part from an 
awareness of the inherent limitations in his moral philosophy. The limitations of his moral philosophy are 
rarely if ever acknowledged by his recent interpreters, at least those applying Kantian philosophy to the 
question of the legal permissibility of markets in organs. 
 Kant’s conclusions are both surprising and intriguing. They raise numerous complex questions 
often overlooked by those attempting to simply apply Kantian moral philosophy to markets in organs. If 
contracts for organs cannot be enforced, then how could anyone agree to buy or sell an organ without 
fearing that the other party would violate the agreement? In what ways could such a market be regulated, 
if contracts cannot be enforced? Could at least some contracts related to organ transplants be enforced? 
For example, could patients enter into contracts with physicians for services related to the removal of a 
kidney? In what way would consent be documented in kidney transactions? We might also wonder about 
the consequences of such a system. Would the legalization of kidney sales obtain the salubrious effect on 
the waiting list that the market in Iran has produced,  or would it lead to even more drastic organ 15
shortages than we now have?  
 Because the purpose of this essay has not been to defend Kant’s position as a policy 
recommendation all things considered, we shall be content to merely note these questions. Because I have 
only argued for Kant’s conclusions insofar as they rest on his own premises, the conclusions reached here 
are not expected to justify any major normative conclusion about the legalization of kidney sales, except 
insofar as one accepts the Kantian premises on which they rest. I do, however, wish to note that the 
present argument suggests at least one modest normative conclusion.  
 In light of Kant’s own explanation about why his moral philosophy cannot underwrite laws or 
policies, arguments that address laws and policies solely on the basis of moral principles should not be 
considered tenable—at least, not from a Kantian perspective. Bioethicists attracted to Kant’s deontological 
approach would do better to follow Kant here by treating the debate about the legality of kidney sales 
primarily as raising issues concerning the source and nature of state authority, rather than raising issues 
about the nature of our moral duties. Those wishing to continue discussing the morality of kidney sales 
 According to Ghods and Savaj (2006), the renal transplant waiting list in Iran was completely eliminated 11 years 15
after the implementation of compensated kidney donation. 
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from a Kantian perspective would do well to explicitly note that there are good reasons to believe that 
their conclusions cannot have direct relevance to the laws and policies regulating kidney distribution. 
Alternatively, they might explain why it is that they reject Kant’s own arguments against using moral 
principles to determine legal duties. 
 Reconfiguring the debate about the laws governing organ distribution so as to become one 
primarily about the source and nature of state authority would make the debate more properly the domain 
of political, rather than moral, philosophy. But, as Kant shows, such a move need not be understood as 
abandoning moral theory in politics, so much as gaining a clear understanding of its proper role and 
inherent limitations. 
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